Limited use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine could speed up the disarmament process, but hypersonic missiles appear to be outpacing nuclear weapons. Does nuclear disarmament run out of object?
On February 15, Clingendael Spectator1 published an interview in English with Antwerp University professor Tom Sauer about the risk of nuclear weapons being deployed. It was the last episode in an 8-part series on the geopolitical consequences of the “Russian war against Ukraine”. Sauer’s research domain is international security, specifically the problems of proliferation, arms control and disarmament of weapons of mass destruction. Clingendael Spectator describes its mission as contributing to independent2 opinion formation on international issues.
Shock and awe
Nuclear weapons have always been presented as a deterrent. They would “yield stability, security and peace”. And yet Russia, “behind a wall of 6,000 nuclear weapons, has cowardly attacked a non-nuclear-weapon state,” said Sauer, who apparently defends that nuclear-weapon states are aggressive by definition. This statement does apply to the nuclear-armed US, for example the shock and awe3 attacks on weak countries such as Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yugoslavia and Libya. But Russia must deal with an existential threat from the united West, and there is nothing cowardly about that. Armed to the teeth, Ukraine is a de facto NATO-member, a situation that eminent American professor John Mearsheimer described as unsustainable for Putin.
But Russia must deal with an existential threat from the united West, and there is nothing cowardly about that. Armed to the teeth, Ukraine is a de facto NATO-member, a situation that eminent American professor John Mearsheimer described as unsustainable for Putin.
Sauer points to the danger of attacks on working nuclear reactors such as those in Zaporizhia. In a disaster, radioactivity can spread in all directions. “The IAEA4 has tried to manage this crisis,” Sauer rightly says, but his commentary that the IAEA depends on Russia’s cooperation misses the point. The nuclear power plant is occupied by the Russian army. Russian specialists and a team of IAEA experts monitor the installation. Is Russia shooting at international experts and its own people? Not likely. The reality is: it is Ukraine that is shelling the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant.
Luck
When asked whether the war in Ukraine reinforces or undermines the concept of nuclear deterrence, Sauer offers a nuanced answer. Proponents and opponents of nuclear deterrence choose arguments to prove their point. Proponents say that a nuclear Ukraine would not have been attacked, opponents point out that nuclear-weapon states have also been attacked in the past, both by non-nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-weapon states. Nuclear deterrence apparently does not always work, it is not a panacea for world peace, the opponents say. For Sauer, the honest answer is that we don’t know whether nuclear deterrence prevents conflict. The world may also have been ‘just’ lucky that no nuclear weapons have been used since 1945.
Whether the war encourages countries to protect themselves with nuclear weapons depends, according to Sauer, on whether nuclear weapons, even a limited number of them, are deployed in Ukraine. If that is the case, then the pressure to ban nuclear weapons will gain the upper hand. If not, then the question of whether countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Brazil, South Korea and Japan go nuclear is determined by regional circumstances rather than the outcome of the war in Ukraine. The question of whether supporters or opponents of nuclear weapons gain the upper hand in those countries also plays a role.
New START
When asked whether nuclear arms control stands a chance, with the alternative being escalation of nuclear rivalries between major powers, Sauer replies that the prospects for a sequel to New START5 are extremely bleak because of the war in Ukraine. Parties accuse each other of non-compliance, so there is a real chance that the treaty will collapse. In the meantime, Russia suspended its participation in the treaty. That decision is appropriate. If Washington repeatedly proclaims that it wants to deliver Russia a strategic defeat, it cannot expect the Russians to allow inspection of their installations. The suspension seems to work as a means of pressure: American hawk Victoria Nuland promptly said that Washington is ready to start talks with Russia “tomorrow” if Moscow is is prepared for this.
If Washington repeatedly proclaims that it wants to deliver Russia a strategic defeat, it cannot expect the Russians to allow inspection of their installations.
That response points to Biden’s desperation to rescue New START in time for the 2024 election. The issue also puts Europe in a bind: Putin is demanding that future nuclear arms control talks should also include the nuclear arsenals of UK and France. These countries will not like to bring their nuclear weapons under international treaties, de facto under the control of Washington. Europe was already “surprised” in 1987 by the unilateral US withdrawal from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which banned intermediate-range nuclear missiles. The treaty ended the “missile crisis” of the 1970s, when the Soviets installed SS-20s that could hit Western Europe but not North America. That led to the installation of US nuclear weapons in Europe.6
Arms control
Sauer is moderately optimistic. After the end of the war, diplomatic talks on nuclear arms control can be a useful tool to improve the overall political relationship between the US and Russia. But, he adds, in the end, bilateral arms control will need to become trilateral. China must participate in the negotiations, and later multilateral agreements must be reached, as required by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Limited use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine could even speed up the disarmament process. However, Sauer thinks the most likely scenario is that no nuclear weapons will be used, that not much will change and that the world will have to deal with nuclear rivalry between great powers and a new nuclear arms race.
One can criticize Sauer’s optimism. Perhaps his positive answer – to the question of whether mutual control over nuclear weapons could be a useful tool for improving the overall political relationship between the US and Russia – should read: “Unfortunately, that is not self-evident. Washington’s belligerence towards Russia is bipartisan and motivated by neocon regime change and break-up objectives for the Russian Federation. Both Democrats and Republicans have neocons in their ranks bent on regime change in Moscow. With the arrival of an ‘obedient’ government, and the Russian Federation broken up, Western multinationals can more easily take advantage of Russian resources.”
Washington’s belligerence towards Russia is bipartisan and motivated by neocon regime change and break-up objectives for the Russian Federation. Both Democrats and Republicans have neocons in their ranks bent on regime change in Moscow.
Mach 8
Finally, a reminder of the reformulated Russian nuclear doctrine that allows for ‘pre-emptive’ tactical nuclear strikes. Moreover, if Kiev deploys Western long-range missiles against Crimea and/or Russian territory, Moscow will drop hypersonic missiles on US military installations in Europe and the US. These missiles can be equipped with nuclear or conventional warheads. Even without a payload, they can destroy underground installations through their kinetic energy alone. And they are immune to air defence. Russia has already tested such a missile in theatre: it took out a Ukrainian weapons depot in rocky soil 60m deep with a Kinzal X-47M2, see the video above. So far, the West can only do that with a nuclear weapon.
The increasing Chinese and Russian deployment of warships armed with hypersonic missiles has not gone unnoticed in the US. US aircraft carriers are particularly vulnerable to such missiles. Chinese missiles would even reach Mach 10, 34,000 meters/second. The Pentagon is divided on on how to respond. Admiral Chas Richard advocates cruise missiles with tactical warheads on ships. His colleague, Admiral Mike Gilday, would rather opt for hypersonic missiles. In the analysis, preference should be given to hypersonic missiles without a warhead. These can be aimed at military targets with an accuracy of one metre. Nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction with wide destructive power, overwhelmingly aimed at civilians, and with nuclear fallout as an after-effect.
In the analysis, preference should be given to hypersonic missiles without a warhead. These can be aimed at military targets with an accuracy of one metre. Nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction with wide destructive power, overwhelmingly aimed at civilians, and with nuclear fallout as an after-effect.
Contact with a few experts/opinion makers about these issues resulted in two responses. Clingendael defence specialist Dick Zandee was only ready to comment in the form of a paid assignment. Antwerp University nuclear expert Tom Sauer did respond substantively. He agrees with our conclusion that new weapon systems such as hypersonics could in principle replace nuclear weapons in the future. He said he has an academic paper in the pipeline pointing this out. We eagerly await his paper.
For now, Russia and China are the only powers that have militarily deployable hypersonic weapons. The US is at least five years behind. If the US catches up and nuclear powers come to realize that hypersonic weapons are outpacing nuclear weapons, it will be a boon to the nuclear disarmament process.
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Notes
1 Clingendael Spectator is a publication of the Netherlands Institute for International Relations Clingendael in collaboration with the Belgian Egmont Institute.
2 The degree of (in)dependence of think tanks can be deduced from their transparency about the origin of their financial resources. Clingendael says it generates income from assignments from “ministries, among others”. This means that the institute must be careful with criticism of government policy. Former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer is chairman of the Institute, someone who, after an initial hesitation, unilaterally defends the positions of the West in the Ukraine dossier. The 2021 annual report (p.102) only mentions turnover, costs, result and number of full-time employees. So the reader has been warned.
3 Shock and Awe stands for the American Blitzkrieg strategy to immediately destroy military and civilian infrastructure with overwhelming power and spectacular violence. Everything that has to do with drinking and waste water, energy and communication has to be destroyed.
4 The abbreviation stands for the International Atomic Energy Agency, an organisation within the United Nations which promotes scientific and technical cooperation in the field of nuclear technology and its peaceful use.
5 New START, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, is the only remaining bilateral arms control treaty between the US and Russia. It expires in 2026.
6 Kleine Brogel in Belgium, Volkel in the Netherlands, Büchel in Germany, Incirlik in Turkey and Aviano and Ghedi in Italy.
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